
Quarter after quarter, Adyen continues to expand at a remarkable pace.
In the third quarter of 2026, net revenue grew 23%, while processed volume increased 30% to €451.1 billion. Unified Commerce net revenue grew 29%, and Platforms grew 46%. These are exceptional growth rates for a payments company already operating at Adyen’s scale.
Adyen’s processed volume is now approaching that of PayPal’s entire ecosystem. PayPal reported approximately $487 billion of TPV during the same quarter, growing by around 6%. The comparison is imperfect because the companies report in different currencies and operate different business mixes. Nevertheless, the contrast in growth is striking. If the present differential were to persist, Adyen could surpass PayPal’s total payment volume within the next several years.
The market, however, focused on Adyen’s decision to discontinue its medium-term EBITDA-margin objective.
I believe this was the correct decision.
When margins decline because competition forces a company to lower prices without receiving anything in return, that is inherently negative. Some take-rate pressure is probably affecting Adyen, particularly as larger customers scale into lower pricing tiers. But that does not appear to be the principal reason behind the revised outlook.
Management is accelerating investment across its team, infrastructure, and product portfolio to capitalize on stronger merchant demand. The acquisitions of Talon.One and Orb broaden Adyen’s offering beyond payment processing into loyalty and billing, potentially allowing the company to become a more complete financial operating platform for its customers. Adyen now expects a 50% EBITDA margin in 2026 while retaining flexibility over the pace of future investment.
That distinction matters. A company should not protect a short-term margin target if doing so means turning away attractive growth opportunities.
Even after these investments, Adyen remains extraordinarily profitable. It combines approximately 50% EBITDA margins with rapid organic growth, strong free-cash-flow conversion, a net-cash balance sheet, founder-led management, and a culture built around long-term customer outcomes. In H1 2026, free-cash-flow conversion reached 86%.
Adyen’s competitive advantage is not simply that it charges less. Its unified platform can help merchants achieve higher authorization rates, reduce operational complexity, consolidate data, and manage payments globally through a single technology stack. That gives Adyen room to offer an attractive total cost to merchants while still earning margins that many competitors cannot match.
The resulting combination is powerful: better economics for customers, exceptional economics for Adyen, and growth materially above the broader payments market.
For a company capable of compounding net revenue at approximately 20%, while maintaining margins near 50%, generating substantial free cash flow and reinvesting into a very large addressable market, net cash and managed by founders who have skin in the game and several decades of experience in the industry, investors should expect to pay a meaningful valuation multiple.
Price still matters. But over a sufficiently long holding period, the difference between paying 20 or 25 times normalized earnings may ultimately matter less than whether the business can compound those earnings at a high rate for another decade. The greatest risk may not be paying a slightly higher multiple. It may be underestimating the duration of Adyen’s growth.
The macroeconomic environment also offers some advantages. Adyen earns revenue from nominal payment activity without assuming the credit risk commonly found in traditional financial institutions. Inflation can therefore support nominal processed volume, although weaker real consumption and higher discount rates remain genuine counterbalances.
Stripe is an exceptional competitor, and it would be a mistake to underestimate it. Fortunately, the opportunity is large enough for more than one winner. A substantial portion of global payments is still processed through legacy providers with fragmented technology, considerable debt, and incentives to protect established revenue pools.
Over the next decade, I expect Adyen and Stripe to capture a growing share of that activity. They do not need to eliminate every incumbent for the investment thesis to work.
Following the latest decline, the market is giving investors another opportunity to own Adyen at a valuation that I believe significantly underestimates its long-term earning power. Naturally, that conclusion depends on the earnings measure used and the assumptions made about future margins. But the central thesis remains unchanged: Adyen is growing quickly, taking share and reinvesting from a position of financial strength.
For that reason, I increased my Adyen position by 35% at €834 per share.
The market wanted greater short-term margin certainty. I would rather Adyen pursue the larger long-term opportunity.
Disclosure: I own shares in Adyen. This article represents my personal opinion and is not investment advice.

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